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Abstract
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This paper examines how Nepal’s 1996–2006 
civil conflict affected women’s decisions to engage 
in employment. Using three waves of the Nepal 
Demographic and Health Survey, the authors employ a 
difference-in-difference approach to identify the impact 
of war on women’s employment decisions. The results 
indicate that as a result of the Maoist-led insurgency, 
women’s employment probabilities were substantially 
higher in 2001 and 2006 relative to the outbreak of war 
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in 1996. These employment results also hold for self-
employment decisions, and they hold for smaller sub-
samples that condition on husband’s migration status and 
women’s status as widows or household heads. Numerous 
robustness checks of the difference-in-difference 
estimates based on alternative empirical methods 
provide compelling evidence that women’s likelihood of 
employment increased as a consequence of the conflict.
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I. Introduction 
 Nepal‟s civil war, which started in 1996, resulted from a movement by Maoist insurgents 
to take advantage of the growing dissatisfaction among the people, especially those living in 
rural areas, with the lack of economic reforms they had expected from a new democratically-
elected government. Beginning in the western region, the conflict engulfed a large part of the 
country in a relatively short period of time. The conflict ended in 2006 when, following a 
prolonged state of emergency and absolute power by the monarch, the Maoist party succeeded in 
brokering a peace agreement that led to a new constitution and the establishment of a people‟s 
republic. During this ten-year period, the conflict led to immense suffering in terms of thousands 
of deaths and injuries. It also caused major economic disruption and placed tremendous 
hardships on the local population. These devastating consequences have led experts to rank 
Nepal‟s “People‟s War” as one of the most intense civil conflicts in the world in recent times 
(Murshed and Gates 2005). 
 The goal of this research is to examine how civil war in Nepal affected women‟s 
decisions about participating in market work. In particular, women may join the labor force in an 
“added worker” effect as they try to compensate for declines in household income caused by 
losses in their husbands‟ earnings due to war-related disruptions, departures, injuries, or deaths. 
Evidence from a number of industrialized countries suggests that the added worker effect was 
strong during the World Wars and the Great Depression, but it has become less important over 
time as women‟s status in the labor market improved (e.g. Finegan and Margo 1994; Prieto-
Rodriguez and Rodriguez-Gutierrez 2003). However, much of the improvement in women‟s 
status is limited to the labor markets of more developed economies. A small but growing number 
of studies for developing countries point to a substantial added worker effect, especially during 
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financial crises (e.g. Parker and Skoufias 2004). In such times, households in developing 
countries cope with declines in income by sending household members to seek employment in 
paid work (Jones et al. 2009). Furthermore, cross-country evidence indicates that women‟s labor 
supply, particularly in Asia and Latin America, is counter-cyclical. That is, women engage in 
more employment and self-employment when aggregate income falls (Bhalotra and Umana-
Aponte 2010).  
 Nepal‟s decade-long conflict is likely to have had an impact on women‟s employment 
probabilities because of disruptions to family life. Not only did the conflict cause widespread 
mortality, especially among men, it also led to an increase in family separation rates and in 
disability rates among husbands. Thus women may have had to work more as they took on the 
role of sole bread-winners in their family. Another channel through which conflict may have 
induced greater labor force participation for women is through displacement of men in the 
household. As noted in Seddon and Adhikari (2003), mainly men left home on a temporary basis 
seeking work and security. It was not common for entire families to move as women often 
remained behind to look after land. Hence conflict may have induced additional work for women 
through different channels. 
 This study employs a difference-in-difference approach to identify the impact of war on 
women‟s employment decisions using data from the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 
from 1996, 2001, and 2006. These data are used to test the hypothesis that with the displacement 
of male workers as a result of the Maoist insurgency, women‟s employment decisions exhibited 
an added worker effect. We find strong evidence that as compared to 1996, the year in which 
conflict started in Nepal, women‟s employment probabilities are significantly higher in 2001 and 
2006 as a result of the conflict. These trends are evident in patterns of self-employment work as 
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well. These employment results for women also hold in regressions that condition on husband‟s 
migration status and women‟s status as widows or household heads. The results are interpreted 
as evidence of a labor supply rather than a labor demand effect. In particular, women responded 
more to the need to work in order to support their households than they responded to the creation 
of new economic opportunities that may have arisen during the war. The analysis includes 
various robustness checks of the difference-in-difference estimates and demonstrates that even 
with the use of alternative empirical methods, there is substantial evidence that women‟s 
likelihood of employment increased as a consequence of the conflict.  
II. Conflict Background and Socioeconomic Context 
 Nepal‟s civil war erupted in 1996 when members of the Communist Nepal-Maoist party 
struck a police station in Rolpa, a district in the western region of Nepal. The motivation behind 
the attack and the subsequent ten years of insurgency had several origins (Deraniyagala 2005; 
Murshed and Gates 2005; Sharma 2006). Anger by members of lower castes and lower-status 
ethnic groups against the elite for long periods of landlessness and deprivation helped to instigate 
and fuel the conflict. Other sources of the insurgency included overall poverty and the lack of 
economic development, as well as dissatisfaction against the government for targeting Maoist 
activists. Regardless of the exact source, the Maoist party used the discontent to further their 
objectives of weakening and eliminating the monarchy. From 1996 onwards, the Maoists used a 
variety of tactics to achieve their goals. Primary among these were attacks on army bases, police 
posts, government officials, and banks. At the height of the conflict, the Maoists controlled most 
rural areas of the country. In 2006 when the conflict ended, a new Constituent Assembly was 
established, and a new Interim Constitution was adopted in 2007. In 2008, Nepal became a 
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Republic, the Maoists held the majority of seats in the new Constituent Assembly, and their 
leader was elected the first Prime Minister.  
 Nepal‟s geographical terrain served as an important determinant of the intensity and 
likelihood of civil war violence. Since government forces outnumbered the insurgents, insurgent 
forces depended on mountainous and forested terrain to help them hide and maneuver. Economic 
development also played a role since the Maoists could find greater support for their cause 
among the poor and disenfranchised. These arguments are supported in Do and Iyer (2010) who 
find conflict-related deaths were substantially higher in districts with higher poverty, and in 
districts characterized by higher elevation and forest coverage. Their results indicate that 
geographic conditions explain approximately 25 percent of the variation across districts in 
conflict intensity, with the pre-1996 rate of poverty at the district level also serving as a positive 
predictor of conflict intensity. The relationship between the intensity of violence and Nepal‟s 
geography and terrain is also supported in Bohara et al. (2006).  
 The civil war entailed enormous social costs. The death toll reached over 13,300, with 
about two-thirds of those deaths being caused by government forces and the remaining one-third 
caused by Maoist insurgents (INSEC 2010). As shown in Panel A of Figure (1), the conflict-
related deaths increased sharply in 2002, an escalation that coincided with Prime Minister‟s 
announcement of a state of emergency and his mobilization of the Royal Nepal Army to combat 
the insurgents. In addition, the drawn-out conflict caused substantial destruction to the country‟s 
infrastructure as well as the postponement of new projects. This crippling of the country‟s 
infrastructure not only restricted access to education and health systems, it also stifled economic 
growth and development. Panel B of Figure (1) shows that the conflict tended to be more intense 
in the mid-western and far-western regions of the country. 
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Insert Figure 1 Here 
 Furthermore, existing migration rates increased to some extent as a consequence of the 
civil war (MHP/NE/MI 2007). This migration caused numerous married couples to live apart for 
extended periods. Our calculations based on the Nepal DHS data indicate that during the conflict 
period, the proportion of women whose husbands had migrated grew over time, as did the 
proportion of women who reported themselves as their household‟s head. As shown in Panel A 
of Figure 2, 16 percent of all ever-married women reported that their husbands had migrated in 
1996; this proportion had risen by about ten percentage points by the end of the conflict period. 
Another 5 percent of all ever-married women reported the loss of their husbands due to death, 
divorce, or separation; this proportion did not change much during the conflict period. Closely 
related, Panel B of Figure 2 shows that the proportion of women who reported themselves as the 
household head more than doubled during the conflict period from seven percent to 15 percent. 
While most of this increase occurred due to the migration of husbands, some growth also 
occurred due to the death, divorce, separation, and incapacitation of husbands. 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 Hence the data show that over time, family separation rates increased, and conflict-
induced mortality of men combined with substantial male migration left a growing proportion of 
women to manage their households. Nepal is certainly not alone in experiencing this dynamic - 
conflict in other countries has also spurred the disintegration of families through recruitment 
from armed groups, forced migration, abductions, and death of family members.
1
 Moreover, 
conflict also imposes economic shocks and curtails development at the macroeconomic level. On 
average, civil wars cause a reduction in GDP per capita growth of 2.2 percent per year (Collier 
1999). Evidence specific to Nepal indicates that declining development expenditures stemming 
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from conflict have strong negative effects on GDP growth (Ra and Singh 2005). In particular, for 
a 4.2% decline in development expenditures, Nepal is forecast to have lost about 1.7% of annual 
growth in GDP between the 2005-2009 fiscal years. That said, the decline in GDP growth is 
likely to be an underestimate as other factors such as destruction of infrastructure, disruption of 
activities, lower private investment, and displacement of people are not taken into account in the 
specifications. Such effects are incorporated in our estimations through the inclusion of controls 
for region and year. 
 Nepal‟s civil war also resulted in a disproportional increase in consumption by 
households with relatively more land, with the landless or those with extremely small amount of 
land suffering from relative deprivation. Such increases in inequality help to explain the rise in 
Maoist recruitment activities, since such activities were relatively more pronounced in districts 
where inequality had increased significantly (Macours, 2010). We control for the effects of 
poverty and inequality in our models.  
Existing literature is not conclusive that a greater proportion of Nepalese women did in 
fact enter the labor force as a result of the conflict-induced changes in household composition 
and income. Assessment results reported in the World Bank (2004) indicate that the absence of 
husbands and their income led to a dramatic increase in women‟s household and farm work 
burdens, but the findings do not specify whether this increased work burden coincided with 
higher rates of employment. The income effect from remittances sent home by migrant husbands 
could have acted as a disincentive for women to become employed. Also, the departure of a 
spouse who contributed to household farm production may have put more pressure on women to 
increase their hours of work in subsistence farming. Both of these arguments help to explain 
Lokshin and Glinskaya‟s (2009) finding of an inverse relationship between men‟s migration and 
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women‟s market work participation in Nepal in 2004. Further evidence in Menon (2009) 
indicates that given the dominance of agriculture as the main source of employment, and the fact 
that agriculture is subject to the variability of rainfall, households in rural Nepal strive to 
diversify their sources of income by investing in off-farm work such as non-agricultural wage or 
self-employment. Since non-agricultural wage employment tends to be dominated by men and is 
relatively less attractive for women in rural Nepal, the added worker effect in this context may 
have manifested itself in the guise of more self-employment being undertaken by women. In 
order to account for effects on self-employment that may differ from overall employment, this 
study estimates impacts separately for self-employment. 
 III. Grouping of Districts into Conflict and Non-Conflict Sub-Regions 
 Our research design centers on the idea that regions in Nepal characterized by greater 
forest coverage, higher elevations, more rainfall, and fewer roads were more conducive to 
guerilla activity and conflict. Following the strategy developed in Angrist and Kugler (2008) and 
in order to avoid feedback effects, we classified regions based on geography from a time period 
that precedes the conflict (1994). Geographical measures from a pre-conflict time period were 
used as instruments to approximate conflict intensity from 1996 to 2006. In a “first stage” 
procedure, we tested the predictive power of these instruments in explaining conflict intensity 
where conflict intensity was measured by the total number of casualties due to state and Maoist 
action from 1996 to 2006.
2
  
 Note that the Nepal employment and conflict data are based on a geographical coding 
scheme that divides Nepal into 75 districts, which are further classified into five regions 
(Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-Western, and Far-Western) and three categories of physical 
terrain (Mountain, Hill, and Terai grasslands). In order to facilitate parameter estimation in the 
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subsequent regressions, we aggregated the 75 districts into 15 sub-regions (the five regions 
interacted with the three types of terrain). More specifically, we took this step in order to reduce 
the number of regional parameters in the estimation of the labor supply equation, which controls 
for region-specific effects using regional fixed effects. If we were to use district level 
aggregation, we would have (over and above the other coefficients in the model) 75 such district-
level parameters versus the 15 sub-regional parameters that we currently have. Since the districts 
are aggregated up to the sub-region level, all the information contained at the district level is still 
reflected in the sub-regional coefficients.  
 Conflict measures cannot be used directly in the estimations since they are likely to be 
co-determined with other variables that might affect women‟s employment. For example, sub-
regions with higher rates of poverty also had more intense conflict (Do and Iyer 2010). We 
hypothesize that geographical measures from a pre-conflict time period provide the exogenous 
variation required to identify the effect of conflict on women‟s work. To test this hypothesis, we 
used the conflict and geographical indicators from Do and Iyer (2010), supplemented with 
additional geographical and weather data on Nepal from Sharma and Subedy (1994). In the first 
stage, the number of state-caused and Maoist-caused deaths from 1996 to 2006 was regressed on 
four indicators of geographical status and two indicators of weather status from 1994, a pre-
conflict year. Indicators of geographical status include the proportion of a sub-region that is 
forested, altitude of the sub-region as a proxy for mountainous/hilly territory, the number of 
major rivers in a sub-region normalized by area, and the total length of the road network 
normalized by the area of the sub-region in 1994. Indicators of weather-related status include 
average annual rainfall normalized by area of the sub-region and average temperature of the sub-
region. As noted above, all indicators cover time periods that preceded the conflict (1994). The 
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geographical and weather related indicators were originally at the district level. These district 
indicators were aggregated to sub-region means using sampling weights provided in the Nepal 
DHS. 
 The first stage results reported in Table 1 indicate a strong correlation between conflict-
induced casualties and the proportion of a sub-region that is forested in 1994. This conclusion 
holds for when state-caused casualties and Maoist-caused casualties are measured separately and 
when they are combined. In regressions that include all six geographical and weather indicators, 
the coefficient on 1994 forest coverage is statistically significant. Forest cover remains 
significant when it is used as the only instrument in linear or binary form. The empirical results 
in Table 1 confirm the theoretical intuition provided above for the correlation between 1994 
forest cover and the number of conflict-induced casualties, thus validating our choice of this 
variable as an instrument.
3
  
To be able to implement a difference-in-difference methodology similar to that in Angrist 
and Kugler (2008), we converted forest coverage into a 0-1 indicator where geographical sub-
regions with forest-coverage exceeding the 75
th
 percentile value were classified as “more-
forested”, and sub-regions with forest-coverage below the 75th percentile were classified as “less-
forested.” Since Nepal in general is quite heavily forested, a higher than average benchmark 
(such as the 75
th
 percentile value) was required to indicate regions that have relatively more 
cover. Note that the first stage results are robust to transforming the dependent variable (total 
conflict-induced casualties) from levels into growth rates over time. Furthermore, our use of a 
categorical functional form for the first stage (as opposed to a linear functional form) is re-
affirmed by a test that plots growth rates in casualties against a linear measure of forest cover in 
1994. This test indicated that the relationship between growth rates and 1994 forest cover is not 
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particularly linear; thus, a non-linear 0-1 form of the instrument was more appropriate in the first 
stage.  
Insert Table 1 Here 
 Before discussing the data and results, it is helpful to present the strengths and 
weaknesses of the difference-in-difference methodology employed in this study. This method is 
appropriate when there are before-and-after time periods and two groups: one that is subject to 
the treatment, and another which is subject to all the other influences on the treatment group 
except the actual treatment itself. Of course, assignment into the treatment and control groups 
should not be systematically pre-determined. This research design is useful because it replicates 
a natural experiment in which one can isolate the effect of the treatment by comparing outcomes 
between the two groups over the two time periods. Since individuals in the treatment group are 
compared to individuals in the control group, and since the groups are comparable except for the 
fact that one receives the treatment while the other does not, the difference-in-difference 
methodology allows the researcher to ascertain the unbiased effect of the treatment alone. This 
methodology also affords confidence that the effect measured is not contaminated by omitted 
variables and/or unobservable effects specific to either group.  
 As noted in Meyer (1995), the validity of the difference-in-difference method rests on 
demonstrating that the treatment and control groups had a similar distribution in outcomes in the 
before time-period. We implement this test before using the difference-in-difference method to 
evaluate the impact of the conflict on women‟s employment probabilities. In the context of our 
study, the “treatment” is conflict, and although women in general may work more when 
husbands have migrated or when they are heads of their households because husbands are 
disabled, the application of the difference-in-difference method allows us to measure how much 
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of the increase in women‟s labor force participation (over and above that which is generally true 
in similar circumstances) is due to conflict alone.  
IV. Conflict and Women’s Employment  
Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 This study‟s employment data come from the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey, a 
large nationally-representative sample of women aged 15-49 and the members of their 
households. We used the three most recently-available waves of the Standard DHS for Nepal: 
1996, 2001, and 2006. These waves correspond with the beginning, middle, and end of the civil 
war. The DHS surveys provide detailed information on the variables we required including 
woman‟s employment status, education, age, marital status, region and terrain of residence, 
religion, and ethnicity; her husband‟s education and his presence in the household; and indicators 
of household composition, household access to electricity, and household amenities. Our 
working sample retains all ever-married women aged 15-49 with measured values for 
employment status and for the other indicators in the empirical analysis, leaving us with 
approximately 25,700 observations in the pooled sample. Note that the indicator for whether or 
not a woman is employed includes employment for cash earnings, in-kind payments, and non-
remunerated work; the data do not allow us to separate these types of work. Among the 
employed women in the pooled data, a large proportion worked either for themselves or for their 
family (about 21,800 observations). We classified such women as self-employed and estimated 
separate regressions for the decision to be self-employed.
4
 
 Sample statistics in Table 2 indicate that a very high proportion of women in Nepal were 
employed throughout the period, and especially in 2001, when 83 percent of women were 
employed in some sort of job, paid or unpaid. Table 2 further indicates that over time, a growing 
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proportion of women lived without their husbands either due to the husband‟s migration or due 
to death, divorce, or separation. By 2006, almost one third of ever-married women lived without 
their husbands present in the household. The majority of women had no education in all three 
years, although this proportion declined sharply over the ten-year period from 80 percent to 63 
percent. Among other indicators, the vast majority of the sample lived in rural areas, with a 
greater tendency to live in Terai grasslands as opposed to the mountains and hills. 
Socioeconomic status indicators show some improvements during the 10 year period, with more 
households having access to electricity and household amenities such as improved flooring, 
radio, and television. Finally, the bulk of the sample claimed Hinduism as their religion, with 
substantial diversity in ethnic groups. 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 As demonstrated in Appendix Table 1, which reports the weighted percentages of the top 
five occupations for employed women across the period of analysis, the vast majority of women 
worked in agricultural self-employment with the proportion of women engaged in this 
occupation peaking during the height of the conflict in 2001.
5
 A very small percentage of 
employed women (1.7 percent in conflict-affected areas) worked in professional, technical, and 
managerial jobs at the height of the conflict, but this occupational category did not appear in the 
top five in 1996. This result provides some evidence that women in conflict-affected areas 
entered the labor market in greater numbers to supplement income. 
As noted above, the difference-in-difference methodology is appropriate in cases where 
the treatment and control samples are comparable in measured characteristics in the pre-
treatment time period. In order to ascertain that this comparability holds in the Nepal context, we 
calculated means of the individual and household indicators at the sub-region level for 1996 and 
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then compared the sub-region means across the more-forested (conflict) and less-forested (non-
conflict) classification. Recall that in the empirical approach, the “treatment” is conflict intensity 
as proxied by forest coverage. Results in Table 3 indicate that when conflict began in 1996, the 
more- and less-forested sub-regions had very similar characteristics in terms of women‟s status, 
household socioeconomic status, and household composition.  
Insert Table 3 Here 
Women’s Employment Decisions: Naïve Probit Estimates 
 The next step is to examine the likelihood of a woman engaging in employment, 
conditional on an indicator for conflict as well as the full set of personal and household 
characteristics. We begin by specifying a standard labor supply equation for ever-married 
women of the following form: 
                              --- (1) 
where i denotes a woman, j denotes a sub-region, and t denotes time. The dependent variable      
is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if the woman is employed and 0 otherwise. The notation 
     is a set of individual and household characteristics that influence women‟s decisions to work 
and includes age, education, an indicator for more than two children of pre-school age within the 
home, and other indicators of quality of the dwelling of the household (such as having electricity 
and improved flooring).
6
 The vector      is a catch-all variable that indicates the effect of 
conflict-related measures over and above the variables in     . The variable includes a 
normalized measure of the number of conflict deaths from 1996 to 2006 first in of itself, then 
restricted to households in which the husband has migrated, and households in which the woman 
is widowed, divorced, separated, or the head of her household for a reason other than the 
husband‟s migration. Finally,    is a sub-region specific effect that is common to all individuals, 
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   is a time specific effect that is common to all individuals, and      is a woman-specific 
idiosyncratic error term.  
 Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, we used a probit model to estimate the 
standard labor supply model in equation (1). These estimates are referred to as “naïve probits” 
since they do not condition for the endogeneity of casualties, husband‟s migration status, or 
whether women are widowed, divorced, separated, or heads of households due to a reason other 
than husband‟s migration. The naïve probits were used as a benchmark against which to compare 
estimates from the difference-in-difference approach, which conditions on the endogeneity of the 
conflict-related variables, and thus allows us to estimate the causal effect of conflict on the 
likelihood of women‟s employment.  
 The naïve probit regression results are reported in Appendix Table 2. In all six columns, 
the conflict indicator is the number of conflict-related casualties by sub-region interacted with 
year dummies. In the table, 1996 is the excluded category – thus conflict interaction terms are 
measured with reference to the beginning of the civil war. Note that columns (3) and (4) depict 
effects specific to women in households with husbands who have migrated, while columns (5) 
and (6) depict effects specific to women who are widowed, separated, divorced, or designated as 
household heads because their husbands are incapacitated. All standard errors were corrected for 
clustering at the sub-region and year level. 
 The first column of Appendix Table 2 shows that as compared to when Nepal‟s civil war 
began, the probability of women‟s employment rose in sub-regions with greater conflict-related 
casualties in 2001 and 2006. The probability of self-employment in areas with more casualties 
was higher as well, although the coefficient in 2006 is measured with less precision. Focusing on 
the first two columns, older women were more likely to be employed, whereas some level of 
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schooling exerted significant negative effects on employment probabilities. In column (3) for 
women whose husbands have migrated, employment probabilities were significantly larger in 
sub-regions with higher civil-war mortality in 2001 and 2006. However, there are no discernible 
effects of the conflict variables on self-employment probabilities in column (4). Coefficients in 
columns (5) and (6) for women whose husbands are absent for reasons other than migration 
suggest that employment probabilities are larger for these women in conflict areas in 2006 as 
compared to 1996, whereas self-employment probabilities are relatively higher in conflict areas 
in 2001 as compared to 1996. In general, the naïve probits exhibit little precision for the marginal 
effects of age and education in this sub-group. 
 In closing, the naïve probits serve to provide a qualitative benchmark – it is the 
difference-in-difference results discussed next that allow us to evaluate the causal impacts of 
conflict on women‟s employment likelihoods. 
Difference-in-Difference Approach 
 The naïve probit estimates suffer from the fact that      could be endogenous. To address 
this issue, we conducted a difference-in-difference approach that focuses on conflict-induced 
changes in women‟s employment as measured by the instrument for conflict. In implementing 
this approach, the standard labor supply equation for ever-married women was amended as 
follows:  
                                     --- (2) 
Where subscripts are as before, and the dependent variable is the same binary variable as in 
equation (1) for whether the woman is employed. The notation      is the same set of exogenous 
individual and household characteristics,    and    are the sub-region specific effect and the 
time specific effect, and      is an idiosyncratic error term. The term of interest,           , 
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represents the difference-in-difference term; it is measured as a set of interactions of the dummy 
variables for the conflict years and the dummy variable for relative forest cover; our instrument. 
In the estimations, the coefficients on the interaction terms (once they are converted into 
marginal probabilities) are interpreted as the marginal effects of Nepal‟s conflict on the 
likelihood of women being employed. 
 This difference-in-difference equation was estimated using a set of probit models for the 
likelihood of employment. We ran models for the employment decision as well as the decision to 
become self-employed, and we ran models for the full sample and two sub-samples: women 
whose husbands had migrated, and women who were either widowed, separated, divorced, or 
living with an incapacitated husband. Table 4 reports the marginal probabilities. Column (1) 
indicates that women living in a conflict sub-region had an increased likelihood of becoming 
employed in 2001 and 2006, and the same is true of the decision to become self-employed. Both 
key terms in the first two columns for all women are positive and statistically significant at the 
.05 level or higher. The magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that compared to 1996, the 
probability of employment was 0.098 higher for women in conflict areas in 2001 and 0.095 
higher in conflict areas in 2006. Thus, there is some decline in 2006 compared to 2001, which is 
consistent with the fact that conflict peaked in the 2001-2002 time period. Effects are similar for 
self-employment in column (2), although the magnitudes of the coefficients are smaller.  
Insert Table 4 Here 
 Table 4 further shows very similar results for the employment decisions of women whose 
husbands have migrated, as well as for the employment decisions of women who manage their 
households due to other reasons. These results support the added worker effect; in particular, the 
hardship associated with civil war served as a strong incentive for women to engage in 
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employment. Interestingly, the coefficients on the conflict instruments in column (4) are 
measured with less precision, suggesting that women with husbands who had migrated were not 
more likely to be self-employed.
7
 Combined with the significant coefficients for overall 
employment in column (3), this result may reflect the high start-up costs of self-employment 
activities. 
 In comparing the difference-in-difference estimates to the naïve probit estimates in 
Appendix Table 2, the naïve probits appear to overestimate the effects of conflict in 2001 on 
employment and self-employment, and underestimate the effects of conflict in 2006 on 
employment and self-employment. Consequently, the differential effects between 2001 and 2006 
for employment and self-employment in the naïve probits are positively biased. In contrast, 
given the difference-in-difference approach and the specification tests conducted below, Table 
4‟s estimates represent the true differential effects between these years for employment and self-
employment for the full sample and the smaller sub-samples.  
Robustness Checks 
 This closing section reports the results of various robustness checks for the main results. 
First, instead of using the forest coverage variable to directly instrument for conflict in the probit 
equations, we estimated marginal probabilities for the likelihood of employment using predicted 
values of conflict. This approach is consistent with a standard two-stage framework. This 
alternative set of estimations was conducted by constructing the predicted value for conflict in a 
first-stage regression, and then including the predicted value for conflict interacted with year 
dummies in a second stage regression. In the first stage, we regressed the total number of 
casualties on a linear version of the forest variable, and then generated a predicted value. This 
predicted value was converted into its categorical counter-part based on the 75th percentile 
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threshold. The categorical predicted variable was then interacted with year dummies and 
included in a second stage probit regression for employment likelihoods. A similar procedure 
was followed in an alternative set of first stage regressions which conditioned on forest coverage 
and other geographical variables, all in linear form.  
 The second-stage marginal probability results for the likelihood of employment are found 
in Table 5. The standard errors in this table are bootstrapped to adjust for use of first-stage 
predicted values in the second-stage. The conclusions closely mirror those described for the main 
difference-in-difference results. In particular, the likelihood of engaging in employment 
increased for women in conflict-intense areas in 2001 and 2006, as compared to 1996. 
Furthermore, conditional on being employed, women were also more likely to engage in self-
employment if they lived in sub-regions with high levels of conflict.  
Insert Table 5 Here 
 Another robustness check for the main results is to identify the impact of conflict on 
women‟s employment using instrumental variable regressions. This strategy was implemented 
by running a set of instrumental variable probit regressions for women‟s decisions to engage in 
employment and in self-employment. For each of these outcomes, we ran three models: the first 
model measured conflict as total mortality, the second model proxied for conflict as the 
proportion of husbands who had migrated at the year and sub-regional level, and the third model 
proxied for conflict as the proportion of women who managed their households due to death, 
divorce, separation, or incapacitation of their husbands at the year and sub-regional level. For 
each of these models, we instrumented for the conflict measure with the binary variable for 
more- or less-forest coverage interacted with a dummy variable that combined 2001 and 2006.
8
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 These results, which are reported in Table 6, indicate that when conflict is measured by 
total casualties or is proxied by husband‟s migration status, civil war strife increased the 
likelihood of women engaging in employment and in self-employment. As shown in columns (1) 
and (2), the coefficients on the interaction terms for conflict are large, positive and statistically 
significant, supporting the hypothesis of an added worker effect for women in Nepal.  
Insert Table 6 Here 
 The third check of the main difference-in-difference results was a set of linear two stage 
least squares (TSLS) estimates for the likelihood of employment at the sub-region level. This 
strategy first entailed transforming all the variables into sub-region averages by year. We then 
ran a set of TSLS regressions for employment using two alternative instruments for conflict: 
first, the linear version of forest coverage, and second, the binary version of forest coverage. In 
both cases the instrument was interacted with the conflict year dummies to capture differential 
effects over time. In keeping with the structure of the previous estimations, the TSLS regressions 
measured conflict in three different ways: total mortality due to state and Maoist violence, the 
proportion of women with husbands who had migrated, and the proportion of women managing 
without their husbands due to his death, divorce, separation, or incapacitation. Table 7 reports 
these results. Overall, the table shows further support for the hypothesis of an added worker 
effect, especially by the end of the conflict in 2006. The instrumented conflict variable interacted 
with the 2006 year dummy is positive and statistically significant in four of the six estimations 
reported. For the two instances when the coefficient on this interaction term is negative or 
imprecisely measured, conflict is measured as women whose husbands had migrated. The 
negative and significant coefficient suggests that at the aggregated sub-regional level, there is 
some limited evidence that remittances may have reduced women‟s likelihood of employment. 
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Insert Table 7 Here 
 The fourth check of our difference-in-difference approach tests the robustness of the 
exclusion restriction. That is, we need to ensure that forest cover has no independent effect on 
the dependent variable and affects women‟s employment only through its effect on conflict. It is 
possible that forest cover may be associated with poverty and other determinants of women‟s 
shadow wages, thus the exclusion restriction might be invalidated. In order to test the validity of 
the exclusion restriction, interactions of year and all variables from the first stage (from Table 1) 
were included in the main difference-in-difference model for employment. We also included a 
measure of district-level poverty from a pre-conflict time period (1995-1996) to this 
specification.
9
 In keeping with the structure of Table 4, separate employment effects for women 
in households where the husband had migrated, and in households where women were widows 
or separated or heads of households due to the husband‟s incapacitation, were also estimated. If 
the exclusion restriction is violated, then the main results of the difference-in-difference model in 
Table 4 should disappear when we control for the additional variables.
10
  
Upon re-estimating this modified version of the model, we found that the exclusion 
restriction is robust. The previous results continue to hold - if anything, marginal employment 
impacts for all women and for women whose husbands had migrated become larger and more 
significant. For widows, separated women, and women in households with disabled husbands, 
the 2006 results remain invariant. We lose some precision for the 2001 coefficients in this sub-
group which, nonetheless, remain positive in sign.
11
 
The final set of tests dealt with checking the robustness of the results to the inclusion of 
variables that may be correlated with biases arising from two sources: selection due to migration, 
and bias arising from omitted variables and serial correlation. Note that migration was already 
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well-entrenched, and the “remittance economy” of Nepal was well-established before the conflict 
began in 1996 (Seddon et al., 1998). Conflict, in of itself, did not cause migration to begin. It is 
true that civil war somewhat increased existing rates of displacement, but this increase occurred 
mainly in the far-western and mid-western regions of the country where the conflict tended to be 
more intense. Moreover, it was mainly men who migrated, leaving women, children, and the 
elderly behind to tend household land. Since we measure employment probabilities for women, 
the possibility of selection in the dependent variable is likely to be small. Finally, since our 
instrument (forest cover) picks up effects specific to regions from which migration may have 
occurred (these areas tend to be relatively heavily forested), any potential bias is likely to be 
conservative in terms of our estimates. If our estimates are influenced by migration, then given 
that remittances from male migrants are likely to reduce women‟s employment probabilities, 
correcting for selection bias should make our current results even stronger.  
We also implemented two further controls for selection bias. First, selection bias would 
be evident if women whose husbands had migrated were systematically different in terms of their 
employment decisions as compared to women whose husbands had not migrated. To check for 
such a difference, we re-ran the above set of specifications for the sub-sample of women whose 
husbands did not migrate. Upon doing so, we found that the results are substantively the same as 
those in the full sample. Note that Table 4 reports results for the sub-sample of women whose 
husbands had migrated and again, the results are comparable to those in the full sample. In the 
second additional check for selection bias, we included husband‟s migration status directly 
among the control variables of equation (2).
12
 Although this variable is statistically significant, 
the coefficients on our instruments remain positive and significant, indicating that our main 
results hold even with a control for husband‟s migration status.  
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 Next, we considered separate effects for employment decisions that excluded self-
employment and found the main results described earlier to be broadly consistent with this new 
specification as well. With the restriction to those who are non-self-employed, the marginal 
effects on our instruments remain positive in sign. However, we lose some precision in estimates 
given the small sample size. Finally to ensure that the results are not confounded by bias due to 
omitted variables and serial correlation, we included separate linear trends for each sub-region 
and found that if anything, our earlier results became even stronger.
13
  
To summarize, the main difference-in-difference results in Table 4 indicate that women‟s 
employment probabilities increased substantially as a consequence of the conflict in Nepal. 
These estimates provide evidence for the existence of an added worker effect for Nepalese 
women. Additional robustness checks that used different empirical methodologies and 
alternative definitions of the conflict variable corroborated the main results. Hence these data 
offer strong empirical evidence that as a result of the decade-long civil strife in Nepal, women 
were more likely to work in order to support their households.  
V. Conclusion and Implications 
 Consistent with the frequent observation that war is development in reverse, the civil war 
in Nepal entailed thousands of casualties and injuries, as well as the destruction of health and 
education infrastructure and stagnation of the economy. The economic repercussions of the war 
weakened the country‟s social fabric as households and communities struggled to survive. An 
important question raised by these changes is whether women were induced to engage in more 
employment (the added worker effect) as a consequence of conflict. 
 This study‟s difference-in-difference strategy uncovered a strong added worker effect 
during Nepal‟s civil war: women who lived in areas of Nepal with high conflict intensity were 
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likely to engage in more employment in relation to comparable women in regions of low conflict 
intensity. Similar trends are evident in the case of self-employment. The main results are robust 
to alternative measures of conflict intensity, sample composition, and estimation strategies. Note 
that aggregating the data to the sub-region level yielded some limited evidence for the idea that 
remittances discouraged women from engaging in employment. 
 It is useful to compare our estimates of the conflict-induced increases in women‟s 
employment and self-employment probabilities with increases in women‟s employment that 
might result from an economic shock such as the husband losing his job. Such a comparison 
allows us to judge the relative size of the conflict shock against that of an economic shock, and 
provides a benchmark against which to measure the importance of conflict effects. Estimates in 
the table of main results indicate that across all women, those with husbands who have migrated, 
and those who are widows, separated, divorced, or household heads due to husband‟s disability, 
employment probabilities are between 0.079 to 0.136 higher for women in conflict areas 
(comparing 2001 and 2006 to 1996, the year in which civil-strife began). In order to judge 
whether these effects are significantly different from the employment effects of an economic 
shock such as having a man in the house who is currently not working or has not worked in the 
last 12 months, we estimated counterparts of the main specifications, after replacing the 
instrument for conflict with indicators of whether a man in the home is currently not working or 
has not worked in the last year. This comparison is somewhat crude but is sufficient to provide a 
tentative threshold. Results indicate that across all categories of women, the indicator for 
husband‟s unemployment has no statistically significant effect on employment or self-
employment probabilities. The sole exception is for the last group of women (widows, separated, 
divorced, and household heads) who show employment effects from having a man not currently 
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working similar in magnitude to those arising from conflict; however, these effects are only 
evident for 2006.  
This benchmark comparison indicates that conflict had substantially different effects on 
women‟s work probabilities as compared to the effect of a local economic shock such as job loss 
for a man in the home. Whereas the economic shock of an unemployed man in the home 
produced little to no impact on women‟s employment decisions, the Nepalese conflict had 
strong, positive, and significant effects on women‟s employment and self-employment 
probabilities. 
 The results have important policy implications both for more immediate changes as well 
as longer-term strategies. In the aftermath of civil war, viable economic policies are required to 
address the concerns that originally contributed to instigating conflict. In the case of Nepal, such 
policies should be tailored towards reducing inequities between different factions. As noted in 
Ghani and Iyer (2010), aid agencies working in tandem with public institutions should 
concentrate on the quick creation of jobs and aim first to fulfill the short-term needs of the 
affected populations.  
The results of this study suggest that job creation would be especially useful for women 
in the aftermath of the civil war. To the extent that the government can use macro-level and 
industrial policies to promote the industrial sector, our results indicate that women‟s incentives in 
terms of employment have changed and they would be particularly receptive to new 
opportunities in industry. Such jobs would, in turn, have the potential to reduce poverty as well 
as income inequality among the poor and among the overall population (Acharya 2008). 
Targeted use of microfinance to support and incentivize women would further aid in ensuring 
food security and economic welfare. Depending on the types of activities in which women 
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choose to engage, public provision of vocational training and dissemination of know-how on 
accounting and management practices would also be useful. Furthermore, public and non-
governmental institutions could play key roles by providing subsidies that facilitate the purchase 
of new profit-enhancing technologies, and by offering support for the marketing and sale of 
products created by women-run businesses. 
If supported with adequate enforcement of labor standards, well-paying jobs would 
contribute to women‟s ability to support their families with cash earnings, which could, in turn, 
improve women‟s sense of autonomy. That said, increased employment opportunities alone are 
not enough to assist women particularly in a country such as Nepal where society places a 
heavier premium on men‟s earnings potential as compared to women‟s earnings potential. This 
argument is supported with findings in Allendorf (2007) that husbands appear to prioritize their 
wives‟ education rather than their wives‟ ability to generate cash earnings in intra-household 
decision-making processes. Moreover, Yabiku (2005) finds that while the marriage market 
placed value on school enrollment for both men and women, working for others was seen as a 
desirable attribute only for men in the marriage market.  
 The emphasis on women‟s education in Nepal relates closely to the long-term 
ramifications of the added worker effect documented in this study. Women in Nepal work long 
hours on average. With the added pressure to sustain their families during times of conflict, an 
inordinately high burden of work would have been placed on the shoulders of Nepalese women. 
Beyond the negative effects of the added work burden on women themselves, it is conceivable 
that this responsibility had consequences for child-welfare. For example, if increased hours of 
work for mothers result in girl children being withdrawn from school to help with chores and 
child-care, the stock of educated women in future cohorts will contract. This decline in schooling 
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has important implications for women‟s relative labor market performance in future generations. 
Although it is outside the purview of this study to document patterns on child welfare and human 
capital formation, we draw attention to child schooling in order to outline spheres in which 
Nepal‟s public institutions can intervene now to counteract future adverse effects of a 
detrimental war that has already been so costly.  
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Table 1. First Stage Results for Conflict Intensity, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 State-Caused Casualties Maoist-Caused Casualties Total Casualties 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 2.505 -0.039 0.474*** 1.039 0.083 0.286*** 3.544 0.045 0.760*** 
 (1.553) (0.263) (0.124) (0.753) (0.117) (0.057) (2.267) (0.375) (0.179) 
Forested 2.247*** 1.700** 0.646** 0.873** 0.653** 0.217 3.120** 2.353** 0.863** 
 (0.658) (0.637) (0.277) (0.319) (0.284) (0.127) (0.961) (0.909) (0.400) 
Roads -0.197   0.212   0.015   
 (1.648)   (0.799)   (2.406)   
Elevation -0.126   -0.047   -0.173   
 (0.108)   (0.052)   (0.157)   
Rivers 0.747   20.021   20.768   
 (159.832)   (77.518)   (233.380)   
Temperature -0.102   -0.035   -0.137   
 (0.070)   (0.034)   (0.102)   
Rain -0.341   -0.315   -0.656   
 (0.627)   (0.304)   (0.915)   
R
2
 0.699 0.354 0.295 0.609 0.288 0.184 0.678 0.340 0.264 
F 11.67*** 7.14** 5.44** 7.48** 5.27** 2.94 10.55** 6.70** 4.67** 
Notes: DHS=Demographic and Health Survey. Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year. Standard errors 
in parentheses. The notation 
*** 
is p<0.01, 
** 
is p<0.05, 
* 
is p<0.10. Model (1) includes each regressor measured as of 1994 as linear variables; 
Model (2) includes only forested in 1994 as a linear variable; and Model (3) includes only forested in 1994 as a binary variable. F-statistics 
reported in the table are the partial F-statistic values for the “Forested” variable. All regressions have 15 observations at the sub-region level. 
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. (1997). 
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Table 2. Women's Status and Household Factors, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 
 
1996 
 
2001 
 
2006 
 
 
Unweighted N 
% of Sample, 
Weighted 
Unweighted N 
% of Sample, 
Weighted 
Unweighted N 
% of Sample, 
Weighted 
 Overall Sample 8373 100.0 8719 100.0 8632 100.0 
Basic indicators of women’s status 
     
Employed 
      
    Yes 6634 77.3 7341 82.9 6481 73.6 
    No 1739 22.7 1378 17.1 2151 26.4 
Husband Gone 
      
    Yes 1747 20.8 2096 25.0 2657 29.7 
    No 6626 79.2 6623 75.0 5975 70.3 
Education 
      
    No schooling 6689 80.0 6265 72.0 5371 62.6 
    Some or all primary school 890 11.0 1272 14.8 1461 16.8 
    Some secondary school 537 6.3 832 9.3 1211 14.1 
    Completed secondary school +  257 2.7 350 3.9 589 6.4 
Literate 
      
    Yes 1802 20.9 3134 35.3 4072 46.7 
    No 6571 79.1 5585 64.7 4560 53.3 
Age 
      
    age<=20 1275 15.5 1218 14.4 1061 12.1 
    20<age<=35 4467 53.4 4744 54.2 4646 53.4 
    age>35 2631 31.2 2757 31.4 2925 34.5 
Geographical indicators 
     
Region 
      
    Eastern 1666 22.9 2067 24.1 1916 21.4 
    Central 2489 33.4 2388 32.1 2213 33.2 
    Western 1584 19.6 1556 20.3 1683 19.4 
    Mid-Western 1389 14.3 1141 13.7 1403 11.7 
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    Far-Western 1245 9.8 1567 9.8 1417 14.2 
Terrain 
      
    Mountain 1055 6.8 1188 6.9 1154 7.1 
    Hill 3577 42.8 3241 41.4 3325 41.3 
    Terai grasslands 3741 50.4 4290 51.6 4153 51.6 
Urban 
      
    Yes 946 8.4 1153 9.6 2279 14.8 
    No 7427 91.6 7566 90.4 6353 85.2 
Socioeconomic status indicators 
    
Husband's education 
     
    No schooling 3367 40.7 3131 37.3 2182 26.2 
    Some or all primary school 1901 22.0 2184 24.8 2349 27.6 
    Some secondary school 1625 19.4 2050 22.8 2458 28.2 
    Completed secondary school + 1480 17.9 1354 15.1 1643 17.9 
House has electricity 
     
    Yes 1552 17.3 2068 22.5 4064 47.4 
    No 6821 82.7 6651 77.5 4568 52.6 
House has improved floor 
     
    Yes 836 8.7 1171 12.0 1920 22.2 
    No 7537 91.3 7548 88.0 6712 77.8 
House has radio 
      
    Yes 3522 40.7 3934 43.9 5229 60.0 
    No 4851 59.3 4785 56.1 3403 40.0 
House has television 
     
    Yes 641 6.9 1245 13.4 2396 29.1 
    No 7732 93.1 7474 86.6 6236 70.9 
Household composition and ethnicity indicators 
   
Two+ children under 5 yrs 
     
    Yes 1102 13.0 960 11.1 740 8.0 
    No 7271 87.0 7759 88.9 7892 92.0 
Religion is Hindu 
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    Yes 7343 87.5 7479 85.5 7537 85.6 
    No 1030 12.5 1240 14.5 1095 14.4 
Ethnic group 
      
    Brahmin 1159 13.6 1122 12.8 1187 12.1 
    Chhetri 1682 17.5 1829 17.8 1899 18.4 
    Occupational 1248 14.6 1720 21.1 1173 12.6 
    All other 4284 54.4 4048 48.3 4373 56.8 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year. 
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. (1997). 
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Table 3. Average Sub-Region Characteristics by More- and Less-Forested, Nepal DHS, 1996 (In 
percent) 
 
 Less-Forested More-Forested Difference 
 Sub-Regions Sub-Regions  
Basic indicators of women's status  
Employed 85.7 81.1 4.6 
 (4.3) (9.2) (9.5) 
Self-Employed 92.2 93.3 -1.1 
 (2.3) (3.6) (4.9) 
Education    
    No schooling 82.6 86.7 -4.1 
 (2.6) (2.5) (5.3) 
    Some or all primary school 9.8 7.6 2.2 
 (1.2) (1.6) (2.4) 
    Some secondary school 5.4 4.3 1.0 
 (1.0) (1.3) (2.2) 
    Completed secondary school+ 2.2 1.4 0.8 
 (0.7) (0.9) (1.4) 
Literate 18.7 15.8 3.0 
 (3.0) (2.8) (6.1) 
Age    
    age<=20 14.8 18.0 -3.2 
 (1.1) (1.3) (2.3) 
    20<age<=35 52.6 52.4 0.1 
 (0.7) (3.1) (1.9) 
    age>35 32.6 29.5 3.1 
 (0.9) (1.8) (1.9) 
Geographical indicator    
Urban 6.4 3.5 2.9 
 (2.7) (2.9) (5.5) 
Socioeconomic status indicators   
Husband's education   
    No schooling 42.8 41.0 1.8 
 (2.9) (3.3) (6.0) 
    Some or all primary school 24.0 24.5 -0.5 
 (1.8) (3.3) (3.9) 
    Some secondary school 18.5 19.3 -0.7 
 (1.2) (2.3) (2.6) 
    Completed secondary school+ 14.6 15.2 -0.6 
 (1.9) (1.8) (3.9) 
House has electricity 15.1 5.8 9.2 
 (3.8) (5.1) (7.9) 
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House has improved floor 8.2 3.5 4.7 
 (2.0) (3.0) (4.1) 
House has radio 39.8 42.3 -2.5 
 (2.4) (4.6) (5.2) 
House has television 5.0 2.7 2.4 
 (2.2) (2.4) (4.6) 
Household composition and ethnicity indicators  
Two+ children under 5 yrs 13.1 15.5 -2.4 
 (1.3) (6.1) (3.8) 
Religion is Hindu 86.3 97.2 -10.9 
 (3.5) (2.5) (7.0) 
Ethnic group    
    Brahmin 14.2 11.0 3.2 
 (1.8) (2.6) (3.8) 
    Chhetri 20.1 43.1 -23.0
**
 
 (4.4) (13.3) (10.6) 
    Occupational 17.8 15.6 2.2 
 (4.1) (5.6) (8.5) 
    All other 47.9 30.3 17.6 
 (7.9) (20.8) (18.2) 
Notes:  Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in 1996. Standard errors in 
parentheses. The notation 
*** 
is p<0.01, 
** 
is p<0.05, 
* 
is p<0.10.  
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. 
(1997). 
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Table 4. Marginal Probabilities for Likelihood of Employment, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 
 
All Women Women with Husbands Migrated Widow/Sep/Div/HH Head 
 
Employed Self-Employed Employed Self-Employed Employed Self-Employed 
Interaction Terms (reference=conflict_1996) 
  
Conflict_2001 0.098
**
 0.063
***
 0.134
**
 0.001 0.099** 0.149
***
 
 
(0.032) (0.010) (0.032) (0.018) (0.023) (0.012) 
Conflict_2006 0.095
***
 0.046
***
 0.136
***
 -0.013 0.079
*
 0.090
*
 
 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.020) (0.029) (0.031) 
Education (reference=no schooling) 
   
    Some or all primary school -0.024
***
 0.025
***
 -0.041
**
 0.034
***
 -0.016 0.079
***
 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.031) (0.020) 
    Some secondary school -0.054
***
 0.013 -0.063
**
 0.020
*
 -0.031 -0.062 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.010) (0.039) (0.061) 
    Completed secondary school+ -0.076
***
 -0.325
***
 -0.153
***
 -0.365
***
 -0.052 -0.043 
 
(0.021) (0.043) (0.049) (0.054) (0.048) (0.078) 
Age (reference=age<=20) 
    
    20<age<=35 0.109
***
 0.004 0.086
***
 0.005 0.108
**
 0.069
**
 
 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.027) (0.012) (0.047) (0.032) 
    age>35 0.146
***
 0.038
***
 0.128
***
 0.016 0.110
*
 0.134
***
 
 
(0.019) (0.011) (0.026) (0.016) (0.072) (0.045) 
Socioeconomic status YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household composition YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year and sub-region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R
2
 0.194 0.207 0.236 0.275 0.174 0.202 
N 25,724 21,807 5,253 4,430 1,404 1,282 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by region-
year. The notation 
*** 
is p<0.01, 
** 
is p<0.05, 
* 
is p<0.10. In each regression the key difference-in-difference terms are the binary variable for more- 
or less-forested interacted with the year dummies. The Widow/Sep/Div/HH Head sub-sample excludes women whose husbands have migrated. 
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. (1997). 
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Table 5. Marginal Probabilities for Likelihood of Employment using Predicted Values, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 
 
Linear Forest Instrument Linear Forest and Other Instruments 
 
Employed Self-Employed Employed Self-Employed 
Interaction Terms (reference=conflict_1996) 
Conflict_2001 0.098
***
 0.063
***
 0.130
***
 0.065
***
 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
Conflict_2006 0.095
***
 0.046
***
 0.056
***
 0.034
**
 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) 
Education (reference=no schooling) 
 
    Some or all primary school -0.024
*** 
 0.025
***
 -0.023
**
 0.025
***
 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
    Some secondary school -0.054
***
 0.013 -0.053
***
 0.013 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) 
    Completed secondary school+ -0.076
***
 -0.325
***
 -0.075
***
 -0.324
***
 
 
(0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.027) 
Age (reference=age<=20) 
  
    20<age<=35 0.109
***
 0.004 0.109
***
 0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
    age>35 0.146
***
 0.038
***
 0.144
***
 0.038
***
 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Socioeconomic status YES YES YES YES 
Household composition YES YES YES YES 
Year and sub-region dummies YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R
2
 0.194 0.207 0.194 0.206 
N 25,724 21,807 25,724 21,807 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by region-
year and bootstrapped to adjust for use of first-stage predicted values in the second-stage. The notation 
*** 
is p<0.01, 
** 
is p<0.05, 
* 
is p<0.10. In 
each regression the conflict-year interactions are constructed as predicted values based on the linear forest instrument only (columns 1 and 2) and 
based on all the geographical variables in linear form (columns 3 and 4).  
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. (1997). 
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Table 6. Instrumental Variable Probits for Likelihood of Employment, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 
 
Likelihood of Employment Likelihood of Self-Employment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Interaction Terms (reference=conflict_1996) 
  
Conflict_2001_2006 0.799
**
 10.692
*
 -61.243 0.744
*
 10.061
*
 -55.379 
 
(0.392) (5.822) (42.690) (0.401) (5.171) (39.992) 
Education (reference=no schooling) 
   
    Some or all primary school -0.102
***
 -0.105
***
 -0.064 0.154
***
 0.137
**
 0.183
***
 
 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.048) (0.056) (0.058) (0.053) 
    Some secondary school -0.206
***
 -0.235
***
 -0.166
***
 0.067 0.012 0.097 
 
(0.045) (0.053) (0.061) (0.077) (0.100) (0.077) 
    Completed secondary school+ -0.280
***
 -0.300
***
 -0.236
***
 -1.130
***
 -1.152
***
 -1.049
***
 
 
(0.070) (0.068) (0.084) (0.110) (0.106) (0.166) 
Age (reference=age<=20) 
    
    20<age<=35 0.421
***
 0.386
***
 0.394
***
 0.024 0.011 0.022 
 
(0.063) (0.075) (0.065) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062) 
    age>35 0.633
***
 0.594
***
 0.599
***
 0.234
***
 0.223
***
 0.229
***
 
 
(0.102) (0.120) (0.103) (0.074) (0.079) (0.075) 
Socioeconomic status YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household composition YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year and sub-region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald test of exogeneity χ2 3.90** 2.23 1.38 5.72** 1.82 1.26 
N 25,724 25,724 25,724 21,807 21,807 21,807 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by region-
year. The notation 
*** 
is p<0.01, 
** 
is p<0.05, 
* 
is p<0.10. In each regression we instrument for conflict with a binary variable for more- or less-
forested interacted with a dummy that combines 2001 and 2006. Model (1) measures conflict as total mortality; Model (2) proxies for conflict as 
number of husbands migrated; and Model (3) proxies for conflict as number of women divorced, separated, widowed, or living with incapacitated 
husbands.  
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. (1997).  
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Table 7. Two Stage Least Squares for Likelihood of Employment at the Sub-Region Level, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 
 
Linear Forest Instrument Binary Forest Instrument 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Interaction Terms (reference=conflict_1996) 
  
Conflict_2001 0.803
*
 -6.672 15.331 0.234 -4.359 4.486 
 
(0.457) (4.073) (10.535) (0.359) (3.017) (5.210) 
Conflict_2006 0.091
***
 -10.595
*
 2.432
***
 0.053
***
 -6.889 1.194
**
 
 
(0.021) (6.298) (0.828) (0.018) (4.676) (0.503) 
Education (reference=no schooling) 
   
    Some or all primary school 0.255 2.328 -0.499 -0.505 1.282 -0.730
**
 
 
(0.706) (1.965) (0.529) (0.549) (1.437) (0.321) 
    Some secondary school 0.903 10.249
*
 0.243 0.326 6.752 0.030 
 
(0.594) (6.108) (0.752) (0.462) (4.525) (0.465) 
    Completed secondary school+ -1.722 14.473 -1.581 -0.709 9.304 -0.488 
 
(1.073) (9.173) (1.875) (0.836) (6.777) (1.085) 
Age (reference=age<=20) 
    
    20<age<=35 0.368 6.085
*
 0.140 0.262 4.136 0.205 
 
(0.342) (3.452) (0.529) (0.264) (2.551) (0.350) 
    age>35 1.346
*
 -0.671 0.881 0.632 -0.226 0.418 
 
(0.757) (1.029) (1.103) (0.586) (0.717) (0.646) 
Socioeconomic status YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household composition YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year and sub-region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald χ2 test 3349*** 467*** 1447*** 5518*** 1121*** 3120*** 
R
2
 0.987 0.908 0.970 0.992 0.962 0.986 
N 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year. Standard errors in parentheses. The notation 
*** 
is p<0.01, 
** 
is p<0.05, 
* 
is p<0.10. The first three regressions instrument for conflict with a linear forest variable interacted with year dummies; the last three 
regressions replace this linear variable with a binary variable for more- or less-forested. Model (1) measures conflict as total mortality; Model (2) 
measures conflict as husbands migrated; and Model (3) measures conflict as women divorced, separated, widowed, or alone.  
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. (1997). 
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Appendix Table 1. Weighted Percentages of the Top Five Occupations for Employed Women by Less/More Forested Regions and 
Year, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 
Less Forested Regions 
1996 2001 2006 
Occupation Weighted % Occupation Weighted % Occupation Weighted % 
agriculture self-employed 77.7 agriculture self-employed 90.1 agriculture self-employed 75.6 
agriculture employee 11.1 sales 4.4 agriculture employee 9.1 
sales 4.1 skilled manual 2.4 sales 5.6 
skilled manual 3.4 prof., technical, managerial 1.7 skilled manual 4.3 
unskilled manual 1.7 unskilled manual 0.5 services 2.2 
      
      More Forested Regions  
1996 2001 2006 
Occupation Weighted % Occupation Weighted % Occupation Weighted % 
agriculture self-employed 91.8 agriculture self-employed 95.1 agriculture self-employed 87.8 
agriculture employee 3.8 sales 2.1 agriculture employee 3.5 
sales 1.5 prof., technical, managerial 1.5 sales 3.3 
unskilled manual 1.1 skilled manual 0.8 services 1.7 
skilled manual 0.8 services 0.3 prof., technical, managerial 1.2 
            
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year. 
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Appendix Table 2. Naïve Probits: Marginal Probabilities for Likelihood of Employment, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 
 
All Women Women with Husbands Migrated Widow/Sep/Div/HH Head 
 
Employed Self-Employed Employed Self-Employed Employed Self-Employed 
Interaction Terms (reference=mortality_1996) 
  
Mortality_2001 0.477
**
 0.384
***
 0.604
**
 0.093 0.454 1.647
***
 
 
(0.201) (0.108) (0.296) (0.104) (0.327) (0.418) 
Mortality_2006 0.045
***
 0.018 0.084
***
 -0.016 0.084
**
 0.080 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.040) (0.053) 
Education (reference=no schooling) 
   
    Some or all primary school -0.024
***
 0.025
***
 -0.041
**
 0.034
***
 -0.015 0.079
***
 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.031) (0.020) 
    Some secondary school -0.054
***
 0.013 -0.063
**
 0.021*
*
 -0.034 -0.061 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.029) (0.010) (0.041) (0.061) 
    Completed secondary school+ -0.076
***
 -0.324
***
 -0.153
***
 -0.363
***
 -0.057 -0.046 
 
(0.021) (0.043) (0.049) (0.054) (0.049) (0.080) 
Age (reference=age<=20) 
    
    20<age<=35 0.109
***
 0.005 0.087
***
 0.005 0.107
**
 0.057 
 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.027) (0.012) (0.048) (0.034) 
    age>35 0.146
***
 0.039
***
 0.129
***
 0.016 0.107
*
 0.122
***
 
 
(0.019) (0.011) (0.026) (0.016) (0.072) (0.046) 
Socioeconomic status YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household composition YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year and sub-region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R
2
 0.193 0.207 0.234 0.276 0.173 0.201 
N 25,724 21,807 5,253 4,430 1,404 1,282 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by region-
year. The notation 
*** 
is p<0.01, 
** 
is p<0.05, 
* 
is p<0.10. In each regression the mortality-year interactions are presumed exogenous and we do not 
instrument for them. The Widow/Sep/Div/HH Head sub-sample excludes women whose husbands have migrated.  
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. (1997). 
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Figure 1. Conflict-related deaths in Nepal, 1996-2006 
 
Panel A: Total Number of Deaths, per Year 
 
Panel B: Number of Deaths Normalized by Populations, by Sub-Region 
 
 
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on INSEC (2010).  
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Figure 2. Indicators of Women Alone, Nepal DHS, 1996-2006 
 
Panel A. Status of Husband's Presence 
 
 
 
Panel B. Status of Household Headship 
 
 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Nepal DHS in each year.  
Source: Authors‟ calculations based on MHP/NE/MI (2007), MH/NE/ORC (2002), and Pradhan et al. 
(1997). 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, de Walque (2006) on Cambodia, Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) on Colombia, 
Blanc (2004) on Eritrea, and Verwimp (2003) on Rwanda. 
2
 In a separate set of regressions, we tested the predictive power of our instruments from 1994 in 
explaining the growth in conflict intensity over the 1996-2006 time period. These regressions are 
not reported in the paper and are available upon request. 
3
 We acknowledge that in the form used in this study‟s regressions (third column of the final 
panel of Table 1), the partial F for the “Forested” variable falls below the generally accepted 
benchmark value of 10. Our results should be interpreted with this in mind. 
4
 We coded as self-employed those individuals who reported that they worked for themselves or 
for their family. The reference group is individuals who worked for someone else.  
5
 Note that the types of occupations do not differ much between less and more forested areas.  
6
 This specification excludes the woman's potential wage, a variable that could also determine 
women‟s participation in the labor market (as in Dex et al. 1995 and Prieto-Rodriguez and 
Rodriguez-Gutierrez 2003 in their studies of the added worker effect). Including this variable 
would necessitate an instrumental variables technique to estimate the potential wage. Because 
the Nepal DHS does not include information on cash earnings in the three years of our analysis, 
we cannot follow this approach. 
7
 Because the two sub-samples of women with husbands not present are not representative of all 
women, the estimates in columns 3-6 may be subject to selectivity bias. We address this issue by 
noting that male migration was already well-entrenched in Nepal before the conflict began. 
Furthermore, a specification check of the average proportion of husbands who had migrated 
regressed on the forest/year interaction terms and the full set of regressors at the year/sub-
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regional level finds no evidence of confounding effects from the pre-conflict instruments in 2001 
or 2006. A similar test for women who are widowed, separated, or household heads for a reason 
other than husband‟s migration also indicates that selection does not affect the results.  
8
 We needed to combine the 2001 and 2006 dummies in order to achieve model convergence. 
9
 Another check involved using district-level means of a wealth index in the 1996 DHS data 
constructed from factor scores as another indicator of poverty. These results were similar to 
those from the district-level measure of poverty for a pre-conflict time period. 
10
 Since more forested regions could be poorer, we included the forest variable directly in the 
difference-in-difference model as a final control for effects related to poverty. The forest variable 
is negative and significant in these runs, indicating that in more-forested areas, women are less 
likely to be employed. However, our main results as measured by the coefficients on the 
forest/year interaction terms remain positive and significant. Thus, even with the inclusion of the 
forest variable directly in the model, our previous results continue to hold. 
11
 These regressions, including those with district means of the DHS 1996 wealth index from 
factor scores, are not reported in the paper. They are available upon request. 
12
 This approach is similar to the strategy followed to address selection bias from migration in 
Angrist and Kugler (2008). 
13
 These regressions, as well as those testing for selection bias described above, are not reported 
in the paper. They are available upon request. 
